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Abstract One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible
worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossi-
ble worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to
probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this
paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic
models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions
which can be constructed from possible and impossible worlds are in an important
sense inexpressible; leaving the probabilistic model committed to saying that agents
in general have at least as many attitudes towards inexpressible propositions as they
do towards expressible propositions. If it is reasonable to think that our attitudes are
generally expressible, then a model with such commitments looks problematic.
Keywords Impossible worlds · Partial belief · Credence · Logical omniscience ·
Probabilistic coherence
Suppose we wish to model the total doxastic state of a typical (non-ideal) subject,
whom we’ll call α.1 We’ll need two main ingredients: one, a way to represent potential
objects of thought, the kinds of things fit to serve as the contents of some cognitive
mental state; and two, a way of representing which of these are the contents of α’s
attitudes.
1 By ‘total doxastic state’ I mean the sum total of facts about the subject’s doxastic attitudes broadly
construed, i.e., α’s full beliefs, partial beliefs, comparative degrees of confidence, and so on—generally,
those aspects of her mental life which characterise how she takes the world to be.
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If our model is to be faithful to the facts, then it’s important that we don’t end
up representing α as being much more rational than she in fact is. What needs to be
done to satisfy this desideratum depends on just how irrational we think non-ideal
agents can be, and opinions vary widely on this matter. But here is something that
almost everyone agrees on: we are not logically infallible. The total doxastic state
of any ordinary agent will usually be logically incoherent in some respect or other.
Total belief sets probably aren’t going to be closed under logical implication, even
on those accounts that seem to make us look very rational indeed (e.g., Lewis 1982;
Stalnaker 1984). And on the face of it, beliefs don’t appear to be closed under even
logical equivalence. The same applies to other kinds of doxastic attitudes: prima facie,
one can be fully confident that either it is raining or it’s not without thereby also being
fully confident that it’s not the case that it’s raining and not raining. The intuitive data
of logical incoherence and hyperintensionality needs to be accounted for—usually, by
modelling the objects of belief using entities that cut finer than logical equivalence.
In this paper, I argue that one common strategy for modelling logically fallible
agents and hyperintensional contents (viz., through the use of impossible worlds) does
not sit nicely with another very common approach to modelling total doxastic states
(viz., through the use of a numerically-valued function defined on a Boolean algebra
of propositions; e.g., a probability function). Roughly, the source of the problem is
that most of the propositions which can be constructed out of a sufficiently rich space
of possible and impossible worlds are in a certain strong sense inexpressible, and any
Boolean algebra defined on such a space will contain at least as many inexpressible
propositions as expressible propositions. Since it’s reasonable to think that most (if not
all) of our doxastic attitudes are expressible, a model which commits us to widespread
inexpressibility looks problematic. We can impose restrictions on the space of worlds
which would prevent the inclusion of inexpressible propositions in the algebra, but
only at the cost of reintroducing (a strong degree of) infallibility.
In Sect. 1, I outline an assumption about the expressibility of thought which be
helpful in setting up my main argument. Then, in Sect. 2, I provide some background on
the problems of logical omniscience as they apply to a standard way of modelling full
belief, and discuss how the introduction of impossible worlds is supposed to help solve
these problems. In Sect. 3, I introduce probabilistic analogues to the classical problems
of logical omniscience, for which an analogous solution involving impossible worlds
seems to apply. Finally, in Sect. 4 I present the central argument of the paper, and in
Sects. 5 and 6, discuss responses.
Before moving on, it’s worth noting some things that I’m not arguing. First, I do
not think that the mere existence of inexpressible propositions should be considered
problematic for the impossible worlds model—nor for that matter do I think that they
would be especially problematic for the possible worlds model. I would not consider
it a devastating problem if our formal models implied that inexpressible propositions
exist, and could potentially serve as the objects of thought for some believers. I do,
however, think that there is serious issue when our models commit us to saying that
inexpressibility is the norm, and it is this problem that I intend to highlight here. (See
Sect. 6 for more discussion on this point.) And second, my argument should not be
read as being against the intelligibility of impossible worlds in general, nor do I want
to claim that there are no benefits to including them within our ontology.
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1 The expressibility hypothesis
In setting up my argument, I will presuppose the existence of an artificial language, L,
about which I will make some assumptions. L can be thought of as a class of declarative
sentences, each a (possibly infinite) string of symbols taken from a (possibly infinite)
alphabet, with a corresponding interpretation. We suppose that every sentence in L is
non-ambiguous, precise, and for the sake of simplicity, context-independent. I’ll stick
to characterising L at the sentential level, since it is here that the issues we will be
interested in arise. Nothing in what follows should be taken to suggest that there can
be no quantifiers, modal operators, and so on, in L.
Next, we will want L to be as expressive as possible with respect to α’s (partial)
beliefs, within the bounds allowed by the present assumptions.2 The most straightfor-
ward version of my argument then proceeds on the basis of an assumption, which I
will call the expressibility hypothesis: that L is maximally expressive, in the sense that
for each distinct belief (or partial belief) that α has, there is a distinct sentence S in
L which expresses the content of that exact belief and no other. L may be capable of
saying much more than this as well, but to begin with we will assume that it is capable
of saying at least this much.
Furthermore, besides having beliefs simpliciter, I assume that α can also have
negative and conjunctive beliefs. For example, α might believe that roses are red, that
violets are blue, and that roses are red and violets are blue, where the latter content
intuitively has normative connections to the former two of the kind we might try to
cash out in terms of conjunction introduction and elimination rules. If the content of
the first belief is captured by a sentence S1 of L, and the content of the second by
S2, then we will use ‘S1 ∧ S2’ to pick out the sentence (or a sentence) of L which
express the third content. Likewise, if α comes to later believe that roses are not red,
then there’s another sentence, ‘¬S1’, which expresses her changed belief.
In saying this, I’m not making any strong commitments in relation to the syntax
of L, which may consist entirely of ‘atomic’ sentences for all I’ve said here. But I
see no good reason to think, if it is possible to have a language capable of expressing
all of our beliefs at all, that there couldn’t also be such a language which contains a
unary connective and a binary connective corresponding to negation and conjunction
respectively. Nor am I saying that α can only have atomic, negative, and conjunctive
beliefs. She may also have conditional beliefs, e.g., a belief that if roses are red then
violets are blue, where this is not just another way of saying that α believes that it’s
not the case that: roses are red and violets are not blue. In that case, we may also
want to have primitive conditional sentences in L. Likewise, α may believe that roses
are red or violets are blue, where this is not the same thing as believing that it’s not
the case that: roses are not red and violets are not blue. We need not commit either
way on these questions. It’s perfectly reasonable to think that L has some non-trivial
2 A note on this: I am ignoring any beliefs which might be, as Perry (1979) calls them, essentially indexical—
e.g., the belief that I am here. The assumption that we can express irreducibly indexical beliefs in a language
whose interpretation is by stipulation context-independent may rightly be doubted. But I am setting this
complication aside because the arguments that follow can be naturally adapted to a centred worlds framework
(see Lewis 1979), which would permit the inclusion of context-dependent sentences back into L.
123
Synthese
syntax at the sentential level. But we may well find that having just two connectives is
fewer than we need to adequately distinguish between the full range of contents that
a typical subject might believe, so we will remain neutral on just what that syntax is.
(The upshot of these points will become apparent in the final paragraphs of Sect. 4.)
Whatever L is, it’s obviously not English, nor any other natural language. But there
is no need to interpret my talk of ‘sentences’ and ‘languages’ too closely on the model
of natural languages. The ‘language’ in question may not be the sort of thing that
any human being could speak, nor need it correspond very closely to the structure
of thought. The ‘sentences’ may be purely mathematical objects, or arbitrary sets of
abstracta. For example, one might want to simply let every object of belief just be a
sentence ofL, and stipulate that every sentence expresses itself.3 Alternatively, perhaps
an appropriately constructed Lagadonian language would be expressive enough for
our purposes.4 In a series of recent works, Mark Jago has defended just this idea
(see esp. his 2012; 2015a; b; cf. also Berto 2010). Indeed, the expressive richness of
Jago’s language is a central component of his use of ersatz possible and impossible
worlds to model hyperintensional contents, in roughly the manner described in the
next section. As he puts it, for sets of ersatz possible and/or impossible worlds to
be an adequate model of hyperintensional content and to overcome the infamous
‘problem of descriptive power’, the world-building “language must be expressible
enough to represent all of the possible and impossible situations we want to represent,
and to represent distinct (possible or impossible) situations as distinct situations” (Jago
2015b, p. 718).
The reader may already be chomping at the bits to deny the expressibility hypothesis.
I ask that they hold off their objections for now. I will return to discuss the matter in
detail in Sect. 6, where I will argue three things—in order of importance,
(i) Although inconclusive, there are general reasons to accept the hypothesis.
(ii) There are prominent accounts of impossible worlds such that the hypothesis (or
a close analogue thereof) is taken for granted, and would be difficult to deny.
(iii) Even if we ultimately ought to deny the hypothesis, the main thrust of the argu-
ment will be largely unchanged.
But that will have to wait until Sect. 6. The central thread of the argument goes
through much smoother if we take the expressibility hypothesis for granted, and it’s
better to discuss the consequences of denying the hypothesis once its importance to
my argument is clear.
3 Compare the discussion on Daniel Nolan’s account of impossible worlds in Sect. 6. Nolan constructs his
space of (possible and impossible) worlds out of a ‘language’ consisting of the objects of thought directly,
using a version of the Really Unrestricted Comprehension principle that I discuss below.
4 A Lagadonian language is one wherein particulars are taken to be names of themselves, and properties
and relations are taken to be predicates for themselves. For example, the content Frank is taller than Mary
may (but need not) be treated as construction out of Frank, Mary, and the is taller than relation.
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2 The problems of logical omniscience
Suppose that  is a non-empty space of possible worlds. I remain neutral as to what
worlds are; what’s important is just that a world ω is the kind of thing such that it
makes sense to say of a declarative sentence S that S is true at ω. In calling  a set of
possible worlds, I’m saying that for every ω ∈  and S, S1, S2, . . . ∈ L:
Non-Contradiction:
At most one of S or ¬S is true at ω
Maximal Specificity:
At least one of S or ¬S is true at ω
Closure under Implication:
If S1, S2, . . . are true at ω and jointly imply S, then S is true at ω
What happens at worlds with respect to sentences that are not in L won’t be important
for our purposes, so in the sequel it should be assumed that the sentences S1, S2, etc.,
that I quantify over are always members of L. I’ll also assume that the relevant notion
of implication (here and throughout) is at least as strong as that of classical sentential
logic. If need be, we can also throw some conceptual or metaphysical necessities in
as well, so as to rule out worlds with, e.g., married bachelors, four-sided triangles,
non-dihydrogen oxide water, and the like.
Call any subset of  a proposition. This is a stipulative usage: I do not assume
that propositions are objects of thought. The powerset of , ℘(), contains every
proposition that can be formed from the worlds in . Every sentence S in L can be
mapped to some (possibly empty) member of ℘() which contains all and only the
worlds where what S says is true. Following a standard notation, we’ll designate this
‘truth set’ of S using ‖S‖. Given the three assumptions I’ve made about , logically
equivalent sentences will always have the same truth sets. Moreover, ¬ and ∧ will
correspond to the basic set operations of complementation and intersection in the
following way:
(i) ‖¬S‖ = ‖S‖C
(ii) ‖S1 ∧ S2‖ = ‖S1‖ ∩ ‖S2‖
With this in place, we might make a start on modelling a total doxastic state. Begin with
a model that originates with (Hintikka 1962), which focuses solely on full belief. Again,
α is our subject. For each world ω, we can associate α with exactly one proposition in
℘(), which we’ll label Rα(ω).Rα(ω) is taken to represent the way the world must
be given all of α’s beliefs at ω. The worlds in Rα(ω) are α’s doxastically accessible
worlds (at ω). In order to capture what α believes at ω, we might first say that any
proposition in ℘() of which Rα(ω) is a subset represents a content that α believes.
The upshot is a compact model of α’s total belief state. Fix an appropriate space of
worlds  and Rα(ω), and the rest of the work is done automatically by the subset
relation.
But that’s a little too quick. Even supposing that there are enough propositions
in ℘() to represent all objects of belief, it may still be the case that ℘() also
contains many propositions that correspond to nothing that can properly be believed.
Modelling objects of belief as sets of worlds does not commit one to saying that every
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set of worlds models an object of belief, and it shouldn’t be taken for granted that
every way the world might be corresponds to something that α can believe.5 So let’s
make a very minor adjustment to the basic Hintikkan model. Suppose that B ⊆ ℘()
contains just those propositions that do model genuine objects of belief, and say:
α believes P iff Rα(ω) ⊆ P and P ∈ B
If every proposition is thinkable, then the inclusion of B adds nothing to the original
model; if not, B serves to filter out any ‘unthinkable’ propositions.
Now it’s well known that this model suffers from a cluster of issues that usually
come under the heading of the problems of logical omniscience. Let me highlight three
examples:
(i) If S1 implies S2 and ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖ ∈ B, then α believes S1 only if she also believes
S2
(ii) If S is a tautology and ‖S‖ ∈ B, then α believes S
(iii) α’s beliefs are inconsistent only if Rα(ω) = ∅ (so α believes everything in B)
The first is a result of Closure under Implication, which ensures that if S1 implies
S2, then ‖S1‖ ⊆ ‖S2‖. Corollary: if S1 and S2 are logically equivalent, then ‖S1‖ =
‖S2‖. Maximal Specificity and Closure under Implication together imply that if S is
a tautology, then ‖S‖ = , and since  is a superset of any proposition in B, this
gives rise to our second problem. With the addition of Non-Contradiction we also get
that if S is a contradiction, then ‖S‖ = ∅, which ultimately leads to the third problem.
Indeed, Non-Contradiction alone says that ‖S‖ and ‖¬S‖ are disjoint, so α can believe
both S and ¬S only if Rα(ω) = ∅.
There’s a number of ways we might try to respond to these problems. Perhaps the
error is in thinking that we can adequately model belief sets using unstructured sets of
possible worlds and simple subset relations. Or, perhaps the error is in thinking that we
can use a single set of worlds Rα(ω) to encode an agent’s total doxastic state at ω, which
may be better represented using multiple ‘fragments’. Or perhaps there isn’t really a
problem here after all, we really are logically omniscient and it is only the complexities
of belief attribution in natural language and our imperfect access to our own beliefs
which makes it seem otherwise. I think that each of these captures part of the truth,
but my intention for this paper is not to suggest a positive solution to the problems
of logical omniscience. Instead, I wish to focus on one common response, which
begins with the thought that perhaps there are not enough propositions in ℘(): we
need to make our space of worlds bigger, to accommodate more fine-grained divisions
amongst the objects of thought.
Suppose we make an extension to , such that it now contains not only all of the
original possible worlds, but also worlds where various kinds of impossible affairs
5 For instance, in response to the Russell–Kaplan paradox (see Davies 1981, p. 262; Kaplan 1995), Lewis
(1986, pp. 104–107) argues that there are many more ways the world might be than there are possible
functional roles, and hence more than there are possible belief contents—at least 3 for the former, and
probably no more than 0 for the latter.
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obtain.6 To make sure that  is rich enough, we will want worlds which are obviously
inconsistent (where both S and ¬S are true), as well as worlds which are inconsistent
in more subtle ways (e.g., worlds where S1 and S2 are true, but S1 ∧ S2 is not true).
Indeed, if we think that agents are capable of extreme logical incoherence, then we
will want to ensure that our worlds are not closed under any non-trivial consequence
relation. It would not be very helpful to remove closure under classical consequence but
retain closure under, e.g., intuitionistic consequence—otherwise, we’re just swapping
one sort of logical omniscience for another.
To really free up the model, then, proponents of impossible worlds will typically
posit a highly permissive comprehension principle, along the following lines:7
Unrestricted Comprehension:
For any maximal set of sentences S ⊆ L, there will be worlds in  where every
S ∈ S is true and no S ∈ L\S is true
Now  contains every logically possible world, plus every maximally specific impossi-
ble world. (Some impossible worlds theorists choose to drop even Maximal Specificity
to allow for incomplete worlds as well. Whether or not we include incomplete worlds
in  won’t make a difference to the arguments of this section.)
By building a model around this expanded space of worlds, it’s easy to block all
three of the unwelcome ‘omniscience’ problems noted earlier. Indeed, we can say
more than this. Let {S1, S2, . . .} be any consistent or inconsistent set of sentences,
and let Rα(ω) be the intersection of ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖, …. Now Rα(ω) will be non-empty,
and for any S that’s not in {S1, S2, …}, there will be at least one maximally specific
world in Rα(ω) where S is not true. So, regardless of what we take α’s set of beliefs
{S1, S2, …} to be, we will be able to find some Rα(ω) such that Rα(ω) ⊆ ‖S‖ if and
only if α believes S. That looks like a nice property for our model to have, and all we
had to do was load  up with enough impossible worlds.
But note a consequence of Unrestricted Comprehension: there is no sentence S—
at least, no sentence in L—such that S is true at all and only the worlds in Rα(ω)
(assuming that α believes more than one thing). Say that a proposition P is expressible
(relative to L) just in case there is a sentence S ∈ L such that P = ‖S‖. The set of
expressible propositions, {‖S‖ : S ∈ L}, is an antichain of < ℘(),⊆>: for any two
distinct sentences S1, S2, there will be worlds in  where S1 is true and S2 isn’t true;
so, ‖S1‖ will never be a subset of ‖S2‖. Suppose that α believes S1 and at least one
other thing S2. Whatever Rα(ω) ends up being, it will have to be a proper subset of
6 The use of impossible worlds to help solve the problem of logical omniscience and related problems in
epistemic logic was explicitly introduced in Rantala (1982), although the idea can also be found in Hintikka
(1975) and Creswell (1973). Numerous authors have since made use of the idea, and a recent defence can
be found in a series of works by Jago (2009, 2013, 2014a, 2015b, 2015a) and Berto (2010). See also Nolan
(1997, 2013), though Nolan’s general focus is on using impossible worlds to give a Lewisian semantics for
counterpossible conditionals. I am focusing on proponents of the so-called “American stance” on impossible
worlds; my arguments are not intended to touch upon the “Australasian” use of impossible worlds qua basis
for an interpretation of some non-classical logic.




both ‖S1‖ and ‖S2‖. So, there’s no S3 such that ‖S3‖ = Rα(ω). Rα(ω) is inexpressible
in L.8
At this point, let me bring in the expressibility hypothesis: for every one of α’s
beliefs, L includes a sentence S which expresses exactly that belief. If this is reason-
able, then it’s only natural to suppose that a proposition should be found in B only if
it is expressible in L; that is, B ⊆ {‖S‖ : S ∈ L}. After all, what could it mean to
represent α as believing a proposition P , where P is not characterised by any sentence
in a language which, ex hypothesi, is capable of expressing every one of α’s beliefs?
And, since Rα(ω) is inexpressible, Rα(ω) /∈ B.
Is this a problem? I’m inclined to think that the inexpressibility of Rα(ω) is not
by itself problematic. It would perhaps have been problematic if we were forced to
assume that Rα(ω) must itself represent something that α believes, and hence that
it should always be included within B. However, nothing internal to the model I’ve
described requires this to be the case. That Rα(ω) should itself be a proposition that α
believes was never a commitment of the original model, even when we were working
with just possible worlds. What’s needed for the representational system to work is
that (a) if Pα ⊆ ℘() is the set of all and only those propositions towards which
some agent α has beliefs at ω, then Pα has some lower bound with respect to ⊆
which we can designate as Rα(ω); and (b) if Pα = Pβ, then Rα(ω) = Rβ(ω). That
is, every distinct total belief state can be uniquely represented by (at least one) set of
doxastically accessible worlds. We can satisfy this by letting Rα(ω) be the intersection
of each proposition that α believes, without supposing that Rα(ω) is itself something
that α believes.
None of this is to say that the impossible worlds model of belief just developed is
without problems—just that it doesn’t commit us to saying that α believes something
she cannot possibly believe. It is worth noting that if we can only believe express-
ible propositions, and no expressible proposition is a subset of any other expressible
proposition, then there is a genuine question as to the point of using this kind of set-
theoretic model to represent our beliefs in the first place. The machinery of set theory
only comes into play at a single step, linking the (non-believed) proposition Rα(ω) to
the set of expressible propositions that α believes, the latter of which has no interesting
set-theoretic structure. The only thing which unites the worlds in the proposition Rα(ω)
is that they are those worlds where each member of a set of sentences S1, S2, S3, …is
true—and characterising that proposition amounts to just listing all and only those
sentences which express something α believes. What we’ve done with Rα(ω) and
⊆, we could have done more perspicuously with a simple list of sentences. We gain
nothing in economy by the addition of Rα(ω), and modelling beliefs as supersets of
Rα(ω) doesn’t seem to illuminate anything of interest.9
8 Note that Rα(ω) can be inexpressible even if we have a name ai for each of the worlds within Rα(ω) and
L contains a way of saying “The actual world is a1 or a2 or …” (or something to that effect). Assuming
that such a sentence exists in L, if an unrestricted comprehension principle holds then the sentence will
be true at some of the worlds in Rα(ω), but it will also be false at some of those worlds (and true at some
worlds outside of Rα(ω)).
9 My complaint in this paragraph parallels one made by Bjerring and Schwarz in their (2017, §3). For
discussion aimed at defending against these kinds of worries, see (Jago 2015a, pp. 595–597).
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3 The problems of probabilistic coherence
So much for full belief. But if you’re like me and you think that beliefs generally come
in degrees (so that full belief is ultimately just a species of partial belief), then you will
likely want your model of α’s doxastic states in general to represent all of her partial
beliefs, not just those that qualify as full beliefs. Luckily enough, there are natural
ways to generalise the basic model outlined in the previous section. As Lewis puts it,
[W]e must also provide for partial belief. Being a [doxastically accessible world]
is not an all or nothing matter, rather it must admit of degree. The simplest picture,
idealised to be sure, replaces the sharp-edged class of [doxastically accessible
worlds] by a subjective probability distribution. …We can say that a [doxastically
accessible world] simpliciter is a possible [world which] gets a non-zero (though
perhaps infinitesimal) share of probability, but the non-zero shares are not all
equal. (1986, p. 30)
In the rest of this paper, I want to focus on partial belief. In the present section, I
will note how problems analogous to those of the traditional (full belief) problems of
logical omniscience arise under a probabilistic model, and how different assumptions
about the structure of  affect it.
For the sake of concreteness, I outline one way to generalise the full belief model
to partial beliefs, along the lines suggested by Lewis. I want to stress that what follows
is an illustrative example only: many of the specific details are not crucial to my
main argument (e.g., the use of a probability mass function D to induce the credence
function Cr ). Readers already familiar with the idea of extending probability theory
to an impossible worlds framework may choose to skim this section.
Let  be any non-empty space of possible and/or impossible worlds.10 This time,
instead of assigning a single proposition Rα(ω) as α’s doxastically accessible worlds,
we will instead represent α’s total doxastic state using a probability distribution
D: 	→ [0, 1]. One could interpret D as representing α’s degree of belief that the
actual world is ω, for each ω in , to the extent at least that (singleton sets of) worlds
are to be included amongst the purported objects of partial belief. But this interpreta-
tion is unnecessary: D, like Rα(ω) earlier, should in the first instance be understood
as a formal tool for modelling doxastic states in the manner to be outlined presently.
In the simplest case, D assigns 0 to all but countably many ω in , and a real value
between 0 and 1 to the remaining worlds such that those values sum to unity. We can
then use D to induce a function Cr on any subset B of ℘() by stipulating that for





Independent of any assumptions about what kinds of worlds are in  and what propo-
sitions get into B, we know that Cr will satisfy:
10 To be clear: we are not making any assumptions yet about which worlds get into ; we will see how




If ∅ is in B, then Cr(∅) = 0
Normalisation:
If  is in B, then Cr() = 1
Monotonicity:
For all pairs P1, P2 in B, if P1 ⊆ P2, then Cr(P1) ≤ Cr(P2)
-Additivity:
If P is any countable set of disjoint propositions in B whose union (⋃ P) is also
in B, then Cr(⋃ P) = ∑P∈P Cr(P)
If B contains ∅, then Cr is a measure on B. But it’s not yet a probability function,
as usually understood. For that, we need to make the additional assumption that B
is some Boolean sub-algebra of ℘(). That is, given what we’ve just said, Cr is a
probability function just in case:
Booleanism:
For all P, P1, P2 ∈ ℘(),
(i) If P ∈ B, then PC ∈ B
(ii) If P1, P2 ∈ B, then P1 ∩ P2 ∈ B
From (i) and (ii), it follows that if P1, P2 ∈ B, then P1∪P2 ∈ B. Booleanism is standard
for the large majority of models of partial belief and a background requirement for
many of the results in probability theory. I return to discuss it again in Sects. 4 and 5.
As we’ll see, it leads to problems if we assume that  has a certain minimal structure,
and that B ⊆ {‖S‖ : S ∈ L}.
But for now, suppose only that B includes all and only those propositions towards
which α has partial beliefs, whatever they may be. In that case, a very natural way to
read Cr is as a representation of α’s total degree of belief state:
P is believed by α to degree x if and only if Cr(P) = x
This generalises the earlier model of full belief quite nicely. On the simplest gener-
alisation, say that full belief equates to degree of belief 1. Then, we will be able to
characterise Rα(ω) as just that set of worlds which are assigned some positive value
by D; thus, Cr(‖S‖) = 1 for every ‖S‖ ∈ B such that Rα(ω) ⊆ ‖S‖. But now we can
also represent each of the many non-extremal grades of belief that α can have towards
any proposition in B, removing the sharp edges between belief and non-belief.
However, if  is a space of possible worlds, then it’s easy to see that the new
model will have its very own problems with logical omniscience. Corresponding to
Nonnegativity, Normalisation, Monotonicity and Σ-Additivity respectively, we can
quickly derive the following constraints of probabilistic coherence:
(i) If S is a contradiction and ‖S‖ ∈ B, then Cr(‖S‖) = 0
(ii) If S is a tautology and ‖S‖ ∈ B, then Cr(‖S‖) = 1
(iii) If S1 implies S2 and ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖ ∈ B, then Cr(‖S1‖) ≤ Cr(‖S2‖)
(iv) If S1 and S2 are inconsistent and ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖, ‖¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2)‖ ∈ B, then
Cr(‖¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2)‖) = Cr(‖S1‖) + Cr(‖S2‖)
Additionally, if full belief is degree of belief 1, then the new model implies that it’s
not even possible for α to have inconsistent beliefs: D must assign a positive value to
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at least one possible world ω, and the set of propositions P such that Cr(P) = 1 will
be consistent. On an alternative account, full belief might be characterised in terms of
exceeding some threshold degree t , for t < 1. In that case, there may be no Rα(ω)
such that α believes P if and only if Rα(ω) ⊆ P , and it may be possible for α’s beliefs
to be inconsistent. However, if t > 0.5, then it will be impossible for α to believe both
S and ¬S simultaneously; and as long as t > 0, it will be impossible for α to believe
any contradictions.
If logical omniscience is bad, then strict probabilistic coherence seems much worse.
And the problems aren’t limited to just probabilistic representations. For instance,
Dubois and Prade’s (1988) possibility theory allows us to systematically construct a
degree of belief function on the basis of what they call a possibility distribution; i.e.,
a function D′ from  into [0, 1] such that D′(ω) = 1 for at least one world ω. Taking
D′ as the basis for our model instead of D, we can define Cr on any subset B of ℘()
as follows:
Cr(∅) = 0, and if P = ∅, then Cr(P) = sup{D′(ω) : ω ∈ P}
Defining Cr in this way implies that it is sub-additive:
If P1, P2, P1 ∪ P2 ∈ B, then Cr(P1 ∪ P2) = max{Cr(P1), Cr(P2)} ≤ Cr(P1) +
Cr(P2)
So, to a limited extent, using possibility distributions would let us avoid strict prob-
abilistic coherence—though, sub-additivity is still a very strong constraint! More
importantly, Cr so-defined will still satisfy Nonnegativity, Normalisation, and Mono-
tonicity, and so Cr will still be constrained by (i)–(iii). In that sense, the possibilistic
model still has to deal with a version of the problems of probabilistic coherence.
The same applies more generally: the vast majority of formal systems for the
representation of partial beliefs will have Cr satisfy at least one of Nonnegativity,
Normalisation, and Monotonicity (or something very similar). For example, Cho-
quet capacities (Choquet 1954; applied in, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992),
Dempster–Shafer belief and plausibility functions (Dempster 1968; Shafer 1976),
ranking functions (Spohn 2012), and the set-valued functions of Levi (1974) and
Kyburg (1992). Where  consists of only possible worlds, all of these models will
have to deal with very strong coherence constraints.
But never fear—impossible worlds to the rescue! If we were to instead define the
probability distribution D on a space of worlds  that satisfies Unrestricted Compre-
hension, then Cr need not satisfy any of the constraints (i)–(iv). Indeed Cr can be almost
as wild and wacky as we want it to be. For instance, suppose that D assigns a positive
value only to worlds where S and S ∧¬S are both true, and never to worlds where ¬S
or ¬(S ∧¬S) are true. Now, assuming that all of the relevant propositions are in Cr ’s
domain, Cr(‖S‖) = Cr(‖S ∧ ¬S‖) = 1, and Cr(‖¬S‖) = Cr(‖¬(S ∧ ¬S)‖) = 0.
Proviso: if Maximal Specificity holds and ‖S‖, ‖¬S‖ ∈ B, then Cr(‖S‖) +
Cr(‖¬S‖) ≥ 1.11 So Unrestricted Comprehension does not give us total freedom
11 Maximal Specificity says that ‖S‖ ∪ ‖¬S‖ = . Normalisation plus Σ -Additivity then imply that
Cr(‖S‖ − ‖¬S‖) + Cr(‖¬S‖ − ‖S‖) + Cr(‖S‖ ∩ ‖¬S‖) = 1. Since Cr(‖S‖ ∩ ‖¬S‖) ≥ 0,Cr(‖S‖) ≥
Cr(‖S‖ − ‖¬S‖) and Cr(‖¬S‖) ≥ Cr(‖¬S‖ − ‖S‖), it follows that Cr(‖S‖) + Cr(‖¬S‖) ≥ 1.
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to let Cr assign values to expressible propositions however we like. But we can fix
this if we’re willing to expand  even further, to allow for non-maximal worlds:
Really Unrestricted Comprehension:
For any set of sentences S ⊆ L, there will be worlds in  where every S ∈ S is
true and no S ∈ L\S is true
Now if you want Cr to assign 0 to both ‖S‖ and ‖¬S‖, you just need to make sure
that D assigns positive values only to worlds where neither S nor ¬S is true. More
generally, for any way you might want Cr to distribute values across a countable set
of expressible propositions, we’ll be able to find a D which generates exactly that
distribution. A quick example to demonstrate the point. Let S1, S2 and S3 be any three
distinct sentences whatsoever. Suppose we want a Cr such that:
Cr(‖S1‖) = x, Cr(‖S2‖) = y, Cr(‖S3‖) = z, and Cr(P) = 0 otherwise,
where x > y > z ≥ 0. To accomplish this, we let D be as follows. Where ω1 is
the world where only S1, S2 and S3 are true, D(ω1) = z. Where ω2 is the world
where only S1 and S2 are true, D(ω2) = y − z. Where ω3 is the world where only
S1 is true, (D ω3) = x − y. The ‘empty world’ (where no sentences whatsoever
are true) is then assigned 1 − x , and every other world is assigned 0. It follows that
Cr(‖S1‖) = x, Cr(‖S2‖) = y, Cr(‖S3‖) = z, and Cr(P) = 0 otherwise. Given my
assumptions about D, the same basic trick can be adopted for any Cr that assigns a
positive value to countably many expressible propositions.
The idea to use a probability function over a space of possible and impossible
worlds in order to model probabilistically incoherent agents is common in conversa-
tion, but also shows up at several points in the literature. Cozic (2006) has recently
advocated the strategy, and Halpern and Pucella (2011, §4) make similar points. Lip-
man (1997) and (1999) attempts to deal with logical non-omniscience by deriving a
probabilistic expected utility representation from an agent’s preferences, where the
probability function in question is defined over a state-space involving both possi-
bilities and impossibilities. Easwaran (2014, esp. pp. 1–2, 29) also suggests using
impossible worlds in our probabilistic models of agents’ doxastic states, albeit in a
slightly different context.
At the risk of belabouring a point that will already be clear to many, let me summarise
the discussion of this section. We can see the ‘problems of probabilistic coherence’
as a consequence of a sequence of modelling choices. First, we need to choose what
kinds of worlds get into . Second, we need to define the function Cr , and characterise
the structure of its domain, B. And finally, we need to say something about how we
are going to interpret Cr . In this respect, things are closely analogous to the problems
of logical omniscience, and the same basic strategies for response are applicable.
The response we’ve discussed centres upon the first modelling choice: by introducing
enough impossible worlds into , we can avoid all of the probabilistic coherence




4 The problem of inexpressibility
In this section, I will argue that if  satisfies a very weak (and very plausible) richness
assumption, then either Booleanism is false, or our model won’t plausibly represent
highly logically fallible agents—which, of course, was the central motivation for
introducing impossible worlds in the first place. The most straightforward way to
make the argument begins with the premise that whatever B is, it should contain only
propositions which are expressible in L.
For any S1, take the set of all worlds in  where S is true, and consider its com-
plement ‖S1‖C. If Unrestricted Comprehension holds, then there is no S2 such that
‖S2‖ = ‖S1‖C. As we’ve already noted, for any pair of sentences S1 and S2, there
will be worlds where S1 and S2 are both true. And if Really Unrestricted Comprehen-
sion also holds, then there will be also be worlds where neither S1 nor S2 is true. In
either case, ‖S1‖ and ‖S2‖ cannot be complements of one another. Hence, if ‖S1‖ is
expressible, then ‖S1‖C is inexpressible. And since we’ve assumed that B is closed
under complementation, it follows that there must be at least as many inexpressible
propositions in Cr ’s domain as there are expressible propositions. And that’s not a
nice result: L is supposed to include a sentence capable of expressing every object of
thought towards which we might have partial beliefs, and yet the model we’ve now
developed is assigning nonsensical values to propositions expressed by no sentences
of L.
We could get around the foregoing argument if (and only if) we adopt the following
restriction on :
Restriction R1:
For every S1 such that ‖S1‖ ∈ B, there is an S2 such that for any ω ∈ , exactly
one of S1 or S2 is true
I’ll have more to say about R1 in a moment, but first, note that merely imposing R1 on
 won’t solve all our problems. We’ve also supposed that B is closed under (at least
finite) intersections, and with only R1 in place the set of expressible propositions (in
B) will still be an antichain of 〈℘(),⊆〉. (The only difference from before is that
{‖S‖ : S ∈ L} will now be closed under complementation.) So take any two sentences
S1 and S2 such that ‖S1‖ = ‖S2‖: there is no S3 such that ‖S3‖ = ‖S1‖∩ ‖S2‖. After
all, nothing about R1 implies that there must be any sentences in L which are true at
a world if and only if two other sentences are true at that world. Likewise, there is no
S3 such that ‖S3‖ = ‖S1‖∪‖S2‖. Consequence: even with R1 in place, there will still
be at least as many inexpressible propositions in Cr ’s domain as there are expressible
propositions.
The following is necessary and sufficient for ensuring that the intersection of any
two expressible propositions (in B) is itself expressible:
Restriction R2:
For every pair S1, S2 such that ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖ ∈ B, there is an S3 such for any
ω ∈ , S1 and S2 are both true at ω if and only if S3 is true at ω
Given R1, R2 also implies that the union of any two expressible propositions (in B)
is expressible. That is, for any pair of expressible propositions ‖S1‖, ‖S2‖ in B, there
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is some sentence S3 such that S3 is true at ω if and only if at least one of S1 or S2 is
true at ω.
Exactly how restrictive R1 and R2 end up being depends heavily on which express-
ible propositions end up included in B. We can safely assume that whatever B is, it will
be richly populated with plenty of expressible propositions, so R1 and R2 are never
trivially satisfied. On the other hand, if there are sentences whose characteristic propo-
sitions are not in B, then R1 and R2 are consistent with certain a degree of freedom in
relation to those sentences. But this is not especially interesting: since B contains all
of the propositions in Cr ’s domain, whatever is true of the expressible propositions not
in B will be irrelevant to the model of α’s degrees of belief that we are left with. Hence,
we can simplify the discussion and pretend henceforth that B = {‖S‖ : S ∈ L}.
The key point in what follows will be that how R1 and R2 can be implemented is
constrained by what kinds of worlds we want to keep in . For example, if we were to
require that  contains at least all of the logically possible worlds, then the S2 referred
to in R1 must be logically equivalent to ¬S1 (if not identical to ¬S1): every logically
possible world where S1 doesn’t hold is one where ¬S1 holds, and if S2 and ¬S1 are
true at the very same logically possible worlds then they must be logically equivalent.
I will not assume that  contains every logically possible world, though I think that
something in the vicinity must be true if we want to use Cr as a model of ideal agents
as well as non-ideal agents. Instead, I will assume something much weaker. Say that
S1 is blatantly inconsistent with S2 just in case either S1 = ¬S2 or S2 = ¬S1. Then
my assumption can be expressed as follows:
Minimal Richness:
For any consistent triple S1, S2, S3, there is at least one world ω ∈  such that:
(i) S1, S2, and S3 are all true at ω, and
(ii) If S4 is blatantly inconsistent with any of S1, S2, or S3, then S4 is not true at ω
Minimal Richness should be uncontroversial, especially since it can be motivated by
precisely the same sorts of considerations which motivate including a rich space of
impossible worlds into our models in the first place.12 Consider: if S1, S2, and S3 are
12 A referee suggests in response to this point that there may be limits on our capacity to believe or have
varying degrees of belief towards multiple contents simultaneously even when they’re jointly consistent;
e.g., if the contents expressed by S1, S2, and S3 are each particularly complex, then representational storage
limits could prevent all three from being simultaneously believed to some positive degree or other. In that
case, it may not be possible for α to have confidence regarding each of S1, S2, and S3 at the same time,
undercutting any immediate formal need for having a world ω in  such that each of S1, S2, and S3 are
true.
There may well be representational storage limits, as a contingent matter of fact, for certain kinds of non-
ideal agents. But suppose we restate Minimal Richness such that it quantifies only over triples S1, S2, S3
such that it is possible for α to have doxastic attitudes towards the contents expressed by S1, S2, and S3
simultaneously. Now, the restricted richness condition in conjunction with R1 will imply that if S2 is true at
all and only the worlds where S1 is not true, then either S2 is logically equivalent to ¬S1, or it’s not possible
for α to have attitudes regarding S2 while having attitudes regarding S1. Likewise, given R2 the restricted
version of the condition implies that if S3 is true at all and only the worlds where S1 and S2 are each true for
a pair S1 and S2 which can be simultaneously entertained, then either S3 is logically equivalent to S1 ∧ S2,
or α cannot have attitudes regarding S3 while also having attitudes towards S1 and S2.
In each case, the latter disjunct would already be problematic given Booleanism. If Cr(‖S1‖) is defined
then so is Cr(‖S1‖C). That is, if ‖S1‖ is in B, then ‖S1‖C is in B, so we should want to be able to say that
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jointly consistent, then it is surely possible for α to have a confidence of, say, greater
than 2/3 in their simultaneous truth, which will only be possible if there is a world in
 where each of the three sentences is true.13 Similarly, it’s surely possible to have the
same high degree of confidence regarding their simultaneous truth while having zero
confidence towards any S4 that’s blatantly inconsistent with S1, S2, or S3. And this is
would only be possible if there’s a world where S1, S2, and S3 are all true and S4 isn’t—
for otherwise, ‖S1‖ ∩ ‖S2‖ ∩ ‖S3‖ ⊆ ‖S4‖, and since Cr(‖S1‖ ∩ ‖S2‖ ∩ ‖S3‖) > 0,
we know that Cr(‖S4‖) > 0.
So let’s consider R1, which states that every S1 can be paired with another sentence
S2 which is true at a world ω if and only if S1 is not true at ω. If Minimal Richness
holds, then whatever S2 ends up being, it must be logically equivalent to ¬S1. For
suppose that S2 is not logically equivalent to ¬S1. Then either S2 does not imply
¬S1, or ¬S1 does not imply S2 (or both). If S2 does not imply ¬S1, then {S2, S1}
is consistent, and there will be at least one world where S2 and S1 are both true,
which contradicts R1. On the other hand, if ¬S1 does not imply S2, then {¬S1,¬S2}
is consistent and there will be worlds where ¬S1 and ¬S2 are both true. Since S1 and
S2 are blatantly inconsistent with ¬S1 and ¬S2 respectively, this would have to be a
world where neither S1 nor S2 is true, which also contradicts R1. Hence, any sentence
S2 that satisfies R1 must be logically equivalent to ¬S1, if Minimal Richness is true.
This leaves us with a limited range of options for implementing R1. The most
straightforward way would be to let the required sentence S2 just be ¬S1. In effect,
this is just to assume that the worlds in  satisfy Non-Contradiction and Maximal
Specificity. And it’s easy enough to think of some plausible motivations for assuming
Non-Contradiction: one could argue that no model of a minimally rational agent’s
doxastic state should represent her as having any degree of belief that both S1 and
¬S1 could be true simultaneously (cf. Lewis 2004; Bjerring 2013; Jago 2014b). To
the extent that we make errors of logical reasoning, they tend to be more subtle—e.g.,
a failure to deduce a downstream consequence of what we believe, rather believing in
blatant inconsistencies.
Motivating Maximal Specificity is a little more difficult, as it amounts to removing
all incomplete worlds from . Some are independently happy to do this (e.g., Bjerring
2014; Bjerring and Schwarz 2017, p. 28; cf. Stalnaker 1996). For others, incomplete
worlds are a crucial aspect of the model (Jago 2014a, b). Furthermore, it’ll be a con-
sequence of assuming Non-Contradiction and Maximal Specificity together that we
lose the capacity to have Cr assign wholly independent values to the pairs ‖S‖ and
Footnote 12 continued
α can have attitudes towards both propositions simultaneously. So, whatever sentence S2 holds at all and
only the worlds where S1 doesn’t hold had better be logically equivalent to ¬S1; and likewise regarding
‖S3‖ = ‖S1‖ ∩ ‖S2‖. Furthermore, the main upshot of the discussion that follows is that if the relevant
sentences S2 and S3 are not ¬S1 and S1 ∧ S2 respectively, then the worlds we are left with in  are closed
under apparently quite arbitrary inference rules which we have no good reasons to believe are adhered to in
general by ordinary agents. Were we to suppose that whenever S1 and S2 are true, there’s a third sentence
S3 which is also true such that (i) S3 is not logically equivalent to S1 ∧ S2 and (ii) cannot be entertained
by α alongside S1 and S2, then we won’t have closed  under any less baffling inference patterns.
13 The proof of this is straightforward given that Cr is a probability function. Suppose that Cr(P1) =
Cr(P2) = Cr(P3) > 2/3. Then Cr(P1 ∩ P2) > 1/3, and since Cr(P3 ∩ (P1 ∩ P2)) = Cr(P3) + Cr(P1 ∩
P2) − Cr(P3 ∩ (P1 ∩ P2)) = 1,Cr(P3 ∩ (P1 ∩ P2)) must be greater than 0.
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‖¬S‖. Indeed, the worlds we are left with are closed under the rules of double negation
introduction and elimination, with Cr satisfying Cr(‖S‖) = Cr(‖¬¬S‖) for all ‖S‖
in B. This is already quite a strong restriction.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that if the implementation of R1 is to be
even remotely well-motivated, then S2 shouldn’t be anything other than ¬S1. Suppose
that S2 is any sentence that’s logically equivalent to ¬S1 other than ¬S1 itself—
say, ¬¬¬S1. We might then keep some non-maximally specific and/or contradictory
worlds in , but now our worlds will be closed under the rules of sextuple negation
introduction (SNI) and elimination (SNE):
(SNI) From S, infer ¬¬¬¬¬¬S
(SNE) From ¬¬¬¬¬¬S, infer S
Any reasons we might have had to avoid closing worlds under the (relatively simple)
rules of double negation would apply with all the more force here: to the extent that
ordinary agents might generally accept something like (SNI) and (SNE), it’s because
they accept that S1 is true if and only if ¬S1 is not true. Given Minimal Richness, the
very best case we can make for implementing R1 involves letting S2 be ¬S1. Anything
else would look implausible and arbitrary.
But it is in combination with R2 that R1 most worrisome. R2 states that every pair
of sentences S1, S2 can be paired with a some S3 such that S3 is true at a world if and
only if both S1 and S2 are true at that world. Given Minimal Richness, we know that
S3 must be logically equivalent to S1 ∧ S2. The argument here is similar to the one
earlier with R1. Suppose that S3 is not logically equivalent to S1 ∧S2. Then S3 doesn’t
imply S1 ∧ S2, or S1 ∧ S2 doesn’t imply S2. If S3 doesn’t imply S1 ∧ S2, then at least
one of the following is consistent:
{S3,¬S1,¬S2}, {S3,¬S1, S2}, {S3, S1,¬S2}
In each case, there will be at least one world in  where S3 is true and at least one of
S1 or S2 is not true, which would contradict R2. If S1 ∧ S2 does not imply S3, then S1
and S2 do not jointly imply S3, so {S1, S2, ¬S3} is consistent and there is at least one
world in  where S1 and S2 are both true and S3 is not. This would also contradict
R2. So, S3 must be at least logically equivalent to S1 ∧ S2.
An argument analogous to that given for R1 then immediately suggests how we
ought to implement the restriction, if at all: require that all worlds in  satisfy ∧-
Consistency:
∧-Consistency:
For all S1, S2 ∈ L, S1 and S2 are both true at ω if and only if S1 ∧ S2 is true at ω
Certainly, it would be absurd to suppose that R2 is not satisfied by S1 ∧ S2, but rather
some other sentence equivalent to S1 ∧ S2. For suppose that R2 was satisfied by,
say, ¬(¬S1 ∧ S2) ∧ ¬(¬S2 ∧ S1) ∧ ¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2). Then our models would have us
representing α as someone who, without fail, always infers back and forth between S1,
S2 and ¬(¬S1 ∧S2)∧¬(¬S2 ∧S1)∧¬(¬S1 ∧¬S2), while potentially skipping over
the much more natural and direct inferences between S1, S2 and S1 ∧ S2. But anyone
who doesn’t reliably follow the rules of conjunction introduction and elimination
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is not going to be unfailingly adhere to any inference rules which link S1, S2 and
¬(¬S1 ∧ S2) ∧ ¬(¬S2 ∧ S1) ∧ ¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2) to one another. (To be sure, one could
in principle describe a consequence relation such that the later inferences are admitted
but the former are not. But why would we think that closing the worlds in  under that
relation makes for a good model any doxastic agent, let alone the typical believer?)
In conjunction with Non-Contradiction and Maximal Specificity, ∧-Consistency
guarantees that ¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2) is true at any world where at least one of S1 or S2 are
true: for any ‖S1‖ and ‖S2‖,
‖S1‖C = ‖¬S1‖, and ‖S1‖ ∩ ‖S2‖ = ‖S1 ∧ S2‖,
Hence,
(‖S1‖C ∩ ‖S2‖C)C = ‖¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2)‖ = ‖S1‖ ∪ ‖S2‖
In fact, they imply that (a) every Boolean combination of expressible propositions
will be expressible by some sentence involving ¬ and/or ∧, and more generally that
(b) every world in  will be closed under the {¬,∧} fragment of classical proposi-
tional logic. We’re fast running out of impossibilities—and with them, our capacity to
represent logically non-ideal subjects.
Now I want to be clear that I’ve not yet said that  contains no impossible worlds
whatsoever. If there are irreducibly disjunctive sentences in L, then a sentence like S1∨
S2 may still behave erratically by, e.g., not being true at all and only the worlds where at
least one of S1 or S2 is true. Likewise, if L contains a primitive conditional connective
→ (i.e., where S1 → S2 is not simply a shorthand for¬(S1∧¬S2)), then we’ve not said
anything to guarantee that the worlds in  must validate even very simple inference
rules like modus ponens. Thus, there may still be plenty of logically impossible worlds
in . Nevertheless, with Non-Contradiction and Maximal Specificity, ∧-Consistency
alone we’ve managed to close  under a very strong consequence relation. Indeed, 
is already only apt for modelling agents who are very good logical reasoners: for every
classically valid inference pattern S1, S2, …⇒ S, the worlds in  will be closed under
an corresponding inference which replaces each of S1, S2, …and S with a classically
equivalent sentence expressed using only ¬ and ∧. For instance, while  might not
be closed under disjunction introduction, we do know that at any world where either
S1 or S2 is true, ¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2) will also be true. And at any world where S1 and
S2 are true, ¬(¬S1 ∧ ¬S2) ∧ ¬(¬S1 ∧ S2) ∧ ¬(S1 ∧ ¬S2) is true. What we have,
in effect, is a model of an agent who is logically infallible with respect to a huge
range of sometimes very complex inferences. That the agent might also be logically
incompetent with respect to other very basic inferences hardly seems to help.
In summary: given Minimal Richness, if we want to preserve Booleanism alongside
the expressibility hypothesis, then we have to close  under some (classically valid)
inferences. We have a certain degree of choice as to what inferences these might be
(e.g., double negation elimination versus sextuple negation elimination). But closing 
under the most simple and natural rules—that is, those rules which ordinary agents are
most likely to consistently follow—leads us directly into closing  under a complete




At the end of Sect. 3, I noted that the problems of probabilistic coherence result
from a sequence of choices, about the formal properties and interpretation of , B,
and Cr . All standard models of partial belief presuppose that B satisfies Booleanism,
and Cr satisfying at least one of Nonnegativity, Normalisation, and Monotonicity or
something very similar; combined with a space of worlds limited only to the possible,
these quickly get us to some very strong coherence constraints on degrees of belief.
We can avoid these constraints without making any significant changes to the standard
models if  includes enough impossible worlds, but doing so will generate a problem
with expressibility.
There are a lot of moving parts here, and consequently, plenty of ways to respond.
As a (non-exhaustive) list of options, we might:
1. Keep the standard probabilistic model of partial belief, and bite the bullet on the
matter of probabilistic coherence.
2. Develop a non-standard model of partial belief which keeps Booleanism but avoids
the probabilistic coherence without resorting to impossible worlds.
3. Develop a non-standard model of partial belief which involves impossible worlds
but doesn’t presuppose Booleanism.
4. Offer an alternative interpretation of Cr (i.e., such that Cr being defined for inex-
pressible propositions does not conflict with the expressibility hypothesis).
5. Reject the expressibility hypothesis.
I’m inclined to think that some combination of the first strategy and (to a much lesser
extent) the second strategy is our best bet. It would be better if we didn’t have to throw
out most of what we’ve managed to achieve regarding the formal representation of
partial belief, so making very significant changes to the basic model outlined in Sect. 3
seems like a rash decision. But moreover, just how bad the problems of probabilistic
coherence actually are depends on just how probabilistically irrational the typical
human is, and there are reasons to think that the probabilistic (possible worlds) model
isn’t too far from the truth (appearances to the contrary notwithstanding). But that is
a big debate, and arguing the point is best left for a different discussion. To conclude,
then, I will in this section say a few words about the third and fourth types of response,
and discuss the fifth type of response in Sect. 6.
With respect to the third strategy, it’s worth noting that Booleanism is not some-
thing to be given up lightly. To be sure, the definition of Cr in terms of a probability
distribution D that I gave in Sect. 3 in no way required any special assumptions about
the structure of B; so it’s clear that we can construct a recognisably ‘probabilistic’
model of partial belief without assuming Booleanism. But then we can raise a ver-
sion of the point made at the end of Sect. 2: if we let  satisfy Really Unrestricted
Comprehension, and simply define B as {‖S‖ : S ∈ L}, then while it’s true that D
will let us encode any arbitrary assignment of values into Cr , it’s hard to see why we
should want to use a probability distribution in the first place. D itself doesn’t directly
represent anything about α’s doxastic state—no S will be true at just one world ω,
so D(ω) cannot be interpreted as a degree of belief towards the singleton proposition
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{ω}. What we really have is just a complicated way of listing out α’s degree of belief
states, with the probabilistic aspects adding nothing to efficiency or illumination.
But that isn’t the only worry in the vicinity. A more important concern, I think,
arises from the fact that Booleanism frequently comes up as a basic assumption in
various representation theorems, where the requirement that B has some minimally
rich algebraic structure is a prerequisite for our being able to assign numerical values
to the contents of B in a meaningful and systematic way. For example, the assumption
plays a role throughout Jeffrey’s (1990) representation theorem for expected utility
theory—where, if we were to assume that the space of thinkable propositions B was
such that none of its members is a subset of any other members, almost all of his axioms
would be either meaningless or trivial. Booleanism is a standard assumption for the-
ories of decision making and uncertainty, with almost all axiomatic decision theories
being built around it. Or consider the common approach to characterising numerical
degrees of belief defined in terms of qualitative belief orderings over propositions,
based on the work of de Finetti (1931) and Scott (1964). Representation theorems
which take us from qualitative belief orderings to probabilities are importantly depen-
dent on B having a rich algebraic structure. Without something like the axiom of
qualitative additivity—that if P1 and P2 both have null intersection with P3, then one
holds P1 to be more likely than P2 if and only if one holds P1 ∪ P3 to be more likely
than P2 ∪ P3—the qualitative belief ordering would lack a sufficiently rich structure
to support anything more than a simple (and representationally inadequate) ordinal
scale.14
With respect to the fourth strategy, we could perhaps keep the probabilistic model
as it is (more or less), but make changes to how we interpret Cr .15 For instance, instead
of saying that Cr(P) = x if and only if α has degree of belief x towards some object of
belief represented by P , we might instead say that Cr represents α’s degrees of belief
only where the propositions in question are expressible. But what then of the values
that Cr assigns to inexpressible propositions? One thought would be to say that while
Cr represents α’s degrees of belief when P is expressible, it represents some other
propositional attitude φ when P is inexpressible. For instance, one might think that
if P is expressible, then Cr(PC) represents α’s degree of rejection towards P , which
plausibly is 1 − Cr(P). However, this kind of ‘rejectionist’ proposal will only work
if the complement of every inexpressible proposition is expressible, which is not in
general the case. In particular, the domain of Cr has to be closed under intersections
and unions, and the complement of the (inexpressible) intersection or union of two
expressible propositions will often be itself inexpressible.
Of course, there may exist some other broadly ‘doxastic’ attitude φ that I’ve not
considered, which takes inexpressible propositions as its objects—but what reason
14 To be sure, there are non-Boolean ‘probability’ theories—for example, quantum probabilities are con-
structed around involutive algebras which need not satisfy Booleanism. I suspect that similar problems as
those raised in Sect. 4 will also arise in most circumstances where B is taken to satisfy a number of basic
algebraic closure conditions, but I have not argued for this.
15 Note that the interpretation of Cr will still have to be recognisably doxastic, otherwise we’re no longer
dealing with a model of α’s doxastic states. I have nothing to say about non-doxastic interpretations of Cr .
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do we have for positing the existence of this φ, beyond the desire to preserve some
modelling assumptions?
6 The expressibility hypothesis (again)
Finally, one may want to go after the assumption that there exists an L of the kind
described in Sect. 1, in which everything that α believes or partially believes is express-
ible. If this is false, then the presence of inexpressible propositions in the domain of Cr
is perhaps even to be expected, not shunned. Maybe we have just discovered that some-
times our partial beliefs towards expressible propositions comes hand-in-hand with
partial beliefs towards inexpressible propositions; the latter are perfectly legitimate
objects of thought, but not all such objects are expressible.
First things first, it should be noted that there are accounts of what worlds are
which cannot plausibly avoid a version of my argument by denying the expressibility
hypothesis. For example, Nolan (1997) favours an approach where (in his terminology)
‘propositions’—the meanings of sentences and the objects of thought—are taken to be
the fundamental entities from which worlds are constructed. On this picture, possible
worlds are maximal consistent sets of propositions à la Adams (1974), while impossi-
ble worlds are those sets of propositions which are inconsistent and/or non-maximal.
Adopting this view, we could let L simply be the class of all propositions qua objects
of thought, trivialising the question as to whether L is ‘expressively rich enough’ to
capture every belief that α might have. We can then easily see that once something like
Unrestricted Comprehension holds, there will be sets of worlds with no proposition in
common amongst their members. These sets of worlds will not only be linguistically
inexpressible, but quite literally unthinkable.16
Furthermore, I have already noted Jago’s work on the expressiveness of Lagado-
nian languages in Sect. 1, which undergirds his linguistic ersatz account of impossible
worlds as arbitrary sets of sentences taken from a pre-specified ‘world-making’ lan-
guage L. And note the central importance of the expressibility hypothesis to the
account, according to which a set-of-worlds proposition P represents some content C
just in case, for every world ω in P , there is a sentence S in ω which expresses that C .
In general, this brand of linguistic ersatzer argues for the representational adequacy of
their propositions qua sets of ‘worlds’ by arguing first that the basic world-making lan-
guage is up to the task of distinguishing between all possible contents of belief, from
which it quickly follows that sets of sets of these sentences can distinguish between
different belief contents—for the simple reason that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the set of sentences S of a language, L, and the set of P ⊆ L such that
S ∈ P . The expressiveness of the ersatz sets-of-worlds model is directly grounded in
16 This point is not unknown to Nolan, who notes in his (1997, p. 563) that there will be sets of worlds
on his account which correspond to no proposition qua object of thought. In personal correspondence,
Nolan has also pointed out that any set of worlds containing only possible worlds will be inexpressible
if  satisfies Unrestricted Comprehension. For any set of possible worlds {ω1,ω2, . . .} there will be an
impossible world ωi such that (a) everything true at all of the worlds in {ω1,ω2, . . .} is true at ωi, and (b)
some impossibility⊥ is also true at ωi. Since ⊥ isn’t true at any possible world, there is nothing that’s true
at all and only the worlds in {ω1,ω2, . . .}.
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the expressiveness of the language it’s built upon, with propositional representation
achieved directly through the meanings of the sentences shared by the worlds within
the propositions.
To be sure, one can imagine an ersatzer who begins with a langauge L which is
expressively inadequate, and claims that those beliefs which cannot be represented
by any sentence of L are nevertheless represented by those subsets which have no
sentences in common. But how is this representation achieved? Certainly, not in the
standard way. Indeed, what reason could we have for thinking that sets of sets of
world-making sentences which have nothing in common will do a reasonable job of
representing the purportedly ‘inexpressible’ beliefs? What content would the inex-
pressible proposition {∅} represent, and does it represent anything different than the
distinct inexpressible proposition ∅? And what does {{S1, S2}, {S3}} represent? That
either S1 ∧ S2, or S3? We already have a content for that:
{ω ⊆  : (S1 ∧ S2) ∨ S3 ∈ ω}
It’s hard to imagine any sort of systematic story about how ersatz propositions with
nothing in common amongst their members could nevertheless serve to represent a
genuine content. And absent such a story, we’re stuck with the standard approach,
which presupposes the expressive adequacy of the world-making language L.
But I don’t want my argument to rest upon specific approaches to characterising
worlds. So, to conclude the discussion, I will proceed as follows. First, I’ll make a
few general points in favour of the expressibility hypothesis. I don’t take any of these
to be conclusive; much like the present state of the literature on the expressibility of
thought, there is plenty of space for disagreement here. It is enough to show, however,
that denying the expressibility hypothesis is no trivial matter. Secondly, and much
more importantly, I’ll end by saying why I don’t think that denying the expressibility
hypothesis is the right way to respond to the argument.
Let me start then by noting that although there are surprisingly few philosophi-
cal discussions regarding whether every possible object of thought is linguistically
expressible, to the extent that the question has been discussed the usual presumptive
answer has been affirmative; e.g., Searle (1969, pp. 19ff), Katz (1978; 1981), Schiffer
(2003, p. 71), Priest (2006, p. 54), and Hofweber (2006). Michael Dummett goes so
far as to state a priori that:
Thoughts differ in all else that is said to be among the contents of the mind in
being wholly communicable: it is of the essence of thought that I can convey to
you the very thought I have […] It is of the essence of thought, not merely to be
communicable, but to be communicable, without residue, by means of language.
(1978, p. 142)
Most of these discussions focus on natural languages, which makes it a little hard to
apply them to the non-natural language L. Of particular note is that natural languages
will contain a variety of context-dependent expressions which serve to expand their
expressiveness, whereas I’ve stipulated that the sentences of L have their meanings
independent of context. Since I’ve made very few substantive assumptions about L, it’s
hard to see why there would be any particular problems for applying lessons drawn
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from natural languages to an language L besides those which arise from context-
sensitivity. Certainly, the fact that the interpretation of L’s sentences are unambiguous
and precise shouldn’t give us any reason to think that it’s less likely we’ll find the right
sentences in L.
We could re-run the argument without supposing that L contains only context-
insensitive expressions. We would then need to speak not of expressibility and
inexpressibility simpliciter, but rather expressibility relative to a context. But, if it’s
not already plausible that every object of belief is expressible in a context-insensitive
language, then it’s not clear why every content of belief should be expressible in a
context-sensitive language in a specific context. A better option, if we thought that
every belief were expressible in some natural language Ln , would be to take Ln as
the basis for the construction of L, which proceeds by systematically eliminating the
context-sensitivity of Ln while preserving overall expressibility. The received view is
that such an elimination is entirely possible—and indeed, easy. As Stalnaker puts it,
it seems at first pass “easy to eliminate context-dependence [since for] any proposi-
tion expressed in context c by sentence S, we may simply stipulate that some other
sentence S′ shall express, in all contexts, that same proposition” (Stalnaker 1984, pp.
151–152).17 If this kind of elimination strategy is viable, then we have every reason
to think that whatever we can say in, e.g., English, we can say in a spruced up and
context-independent version of English.
But all this depends on a more general assumption that our beliefs ought to be
linguistically expressible somehow or other, which the reader may very well doubt.
Nevertheless, the existence of something much like L is strongly suggested by a wide
variety of positions in philosophy. The assumption plays a role in important attempts
to explain mental representation. If one accepts the arguments for the existence of a
Language of Thought as the psychological basis for our capacity to have propositional
attitudes, then the existence of a language like L seems hard to deny. According to
this popular view, thinking in general is a computational process sensitive only to the
(context-independent) syntax of strings of symbols in a compositional Language of
Thought, and one has a belief with content P only in the event that they are appro-
priately related to a sentence in this language which means that P . The existence of
a language rich enough to express each of our beliefs is also presupposed a number
of models of mental content. For instance, and besides the Lagadonian approaches
already mentioned, Chalmers models the contents of thoughts—including our partial
beliefs—as sets of scenarios, with each scenario being an ‘epistemically complete’
description of way the world might be for all we know a priori in an idealised lan-
guage consisting of vocabulary for describing the microphysical and phenomenal
characteristics of the world (see his 2011, 2012). That is, each scenario is a (poten-
tially infinitary) conjunction of sentences in an ideal language, with each scenario
being inconsistent with every other scenario. To express any set of scenarios in this
language, a (potentially infinitary) disjunction of scenarios will suffice.
With all that said, the recent literature has seen some purported counterexamples
to my assumption about the expressibility of belief. Shaw (2013) develops a variation
17 Of course, not everyone agrees with the received view. See Recanati (1994) and Carston (2002, p. 30ff)
for a more conservative perspective on whether this kind of elimination strategy is clearly viable.
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on the Berry paradox to argue for the existence of a kind of inexpressible thought
content—an instance of a case which he says “happens on extremely rare occasions
due to a particular kind of linguistic technicality” (p. 70). Hellie (2004) has also
argued that there may be truths about phenomenal experience which we can appre-
ciate but cannot express linguistically. And if one thinks that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between ways the world might be and possible belief contents, then
there are also classic expressive inadequacy arguments involving qualitatively indis-
cernible individuals and alien properties, to the effect that no language can describe
every possibility (e.g., Lewis 1986, p. 157ff; Bricker 1987). I will not discuss any of
these points in detail. Perhaps each gives rise to a genuine problem for the expressibil-
ity hypothesis. But acquiescing on this point hardly seems to help with the problem
currently at hand. The inexpressibility of most of Cr ’s domain cannot be explained
by an occasional linguistic technicality. And moreover, the inexpressible propositions
that we have been describing are not plausibly about some ineffable aspect of our
phenomenal experience, alien properties, or qualitatively indiscernible individuals.
If L lacks the expressive power to represent our thoughts about such things—so be
it. Let L represent a language capable of expressing only those more mundane beliefs
which are expressible, like the belief that roses are red. (If need be, let L be the set
of declarative sentences of English, and fix a context.) What kind of content could the
set of worlds where ‘Roses are red’ is not true represent, if not that roses are not red?
Clearly, it has something to do with roses and redness—but what? We can’t express it,
sure, but it doesn’t even seem like there’s anything content-like in the vicinity for us
to believe. At best, the inexpressible propositions we’ve been talking about look like
an artefact of the model, not some newly discovered kind of content towards which
most of our beliefs are directed.
This is, of course, a version of the argument above against the hypothetical linguistic
ersatzer who denies the expressibility hypothesis. The point here is general, and con-
stitutes the central reason why going after the expressibility hypothesis looks like the
wrong strategy. An adequate response to the argument of Sect. 4 can’t be to just point
out that there may be some possible things that α could believe which are not express-
ible. The odd inexpressible object of thought here and there isn’t an immediate cause
for concern: the underlying problem survives mere counterexamples to the existence
of L. Unless we make serious changes to the basic probabilistic model of our beliefs,
then so long as Booleanism and (Really) Unrestricted Comprehension are true, if you
have a degree of belief x towards ‖S‖ you will have a degree of belief (1 – x) towards
the mysteriously inexpressible proposition ‖S‖C; and if you have degrees of belief x
and y towards ‖S1‖ and ‖S2‖ then you’ll have some degree of belief z ≤ x, y towards
the inexpressible ‖S1‖∩‖S2‖ and ((x + y)− z) towards ‖S1‖∪‖S2‖. Inexpressibility
on this model is not some esoteric phenomenon resting on a technicality, nor does it
seem to be limited to a specific kind of topic (e.g., phenomenology, alien properties,
and indiscernible individuals) about which we might have beliefs.
For similar reasons, I am not moved by simple cardinality arguments aimed at
showing that we must accept the existence of inexpressible propositions, regardless
of whether we adopt impossible worlds into our ontology or not. Some vigorously
intuit that for any subset S of any language L, α might (partially) believe that all and
only the sentences of S are true. If L is set-sized, then the cardinality of the ℘(L) is
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strictly greater than that of L. It follows that L cannot contain a unique sentence S for
each subset S ⊆ L to the effect of ‘All and only the elements of S are true’. Thus,
either the content in question is not expressible at all, or it cannot be expressed in
L—either way, L is not up to the task of expressing everything that α might believe.
But even if the intuition underlying this argument is correct—and it is by no means
obvious that it is—the conclusion is merely that we must accept that we might have
some inexpressible (partial) beliefs. What the argument doesn’t do is give us any
reason to think that the algebra of propositions B that constitutes what α actually has
partial beliefs towards is filled to the brim with inexpressible propositions. Indeed, it’s
perfectly consistent with the argument’s conclusion that B contains no inexpressible
propositions at all!
We get to keep the model only if we’re happy with the implication that thinkers
systematically have at least as many partial beliefs towards inexpressible propositions
as they do towards expressible propositions. And that is a hard pill to swallow. If
we’re to be expected to swallow it, we’ll need good reasons to think that (a) these
inexpressible propositions exist, (b) that they have such-and-such systematic relations
to the expressible propositions, and (c) that they can and indeed always are believed.
And those reasons can’t be just that these are consequence of a model which includes
possible and impossible worlds.
The probabilistic analogues of the problems of logical omniscience require some
response. The solution we end up with may involve the introduction of impossible
worlds, but this looks to be a viable solution only if we drop the very standard—and
very important—assumption of Booleanism, or if we embrace the inexpressibility of
most of our thoughts. Neither option seems particularly appealing, and we may well
do better to look for a solution without the impossible.
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